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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

By F.

HODGE O'NEAL*

The amount of litigation in Georgia on workmen's compensation is
much greater than is commonly supposed. During the survey period thirtyfive cases were decided in the appellate courts of Georgia. As industry
moves into this state, the number of compensation cases can be expected
to increase. Several of the cases decided during the year were hard-fought
and raised questions of first impression in this state. Lawyers will do well
to acquaint themselves with developments in this rapidly-expanding field of
law.
Perhaps before recent developments in the field of workmen's compensation are examined, salient features of the Workmen'5 Compensation
Statute should be reviewed. That legislation, it will be recalled, imposes
liability on the employer and his insurance carrier to compensate for disability or death of an employee resulting from accidental injury arising
out of and in the course of employment. Liability is imposed on the employer regardless of whether he is at fault, and, for that matter, without regard to the fault of the employee as long as he refrains from willful
misconduct. The statute graduates compensation for disability according
to a prescribed scale based upon loss of earning power and the character
and duration of the disability.
The Workmen's Compensation Statute was adopted in Georgia in 1920.
Since that time the cost of living has increased considerably, and the General Assembly, following the trend in other states, has gradually raised
the benefits payable to the employee and his dependents. The last increase
in benefits occurred in 1949.'

For a claimant to be entitled to compensation, the injury must result
from an accident "arising out of and in the course of the employment."' The
two elements must concur before recovery is authorized,- and the burden
*Dean, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University; On Leave of Absence,
1950-1951; A.B., 1938; LL.B., 1940, Louisiana State University; J.S.D., 1949, Yale
Law School; Member Georgia Bar Association.
1. Ga. Laws 1949, pp. 1357-1360. Under the 1949 Act, an employee who is totally incapacitated is entitled, while so incapacitated, to weekly benefits of ene-half his
average wages; but the benefits cannot be more than $24 or less than $7 a week,
except that where the weekly wage is less than seven dollars the benefit will be the
same as the weekly wage. Benefits for total incapacity cannot continue for more
than 350 weeks. Under the act, an employee who is partially incapacitated is entitled, while so incapacitated, to weekly benefits equal to one-half the difference
between his average weekly wage before the injury and the average weekly wage
he is able to earn thereafter; but the benefits cannot exceed $15 a week nor continue for longer than 300 weeks from the date of the injury. In case the partial
incapacity begins after a period of total incapacity, the latter period shall be deducted from the maximum period herein allowed for partial incapacity. The total
compensation payable shall in no case exceed $5,000. Ga. Laws 1949, pp. 1357,
1358-1359. The 1949 Act also increases the benefits allowable for burial expenses
and medical attention. Ga. Laws 1949, p. 1359.
2. Ga. Laws 1920, p. 167, Ga. Laws 1922, pp. 185-186, Ga. Laws 1946, pp. 103-104, GA.
CODE ANN. § 114-102 (Supp. 1947).
3. Atlanta Refining Co. v. Sheffield, 162 Ga. 676, 134 S.E. 761 (1926) ; Montgomery v.
Maryland Casualty Co., 39 Ga. App. 210, 146 S.E. 504 (1929) ; Maryland Casualty
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is on the claimant to prove both elements.' The words "arising out of employment" refer to the casual connection between employment and injury.5
An injury is said to arise out of employment when the employment is a
"contributing proximate cause" of it6 or "when
there is apparent to
rational mind, upon consideration of all circumstances, casual connectiona
between conditions under which the work is required to be performed and
the resulting injury. ' The words "in the course of employment" refer to
the time, place and circumstances under which the accident occurs An
injury arises in the course of employment when it occurs within the period
of employment, at a place where the employee reasonably may be in performance of his duties, and while he is fulfilling those duties or engaged
in doing something incidental thereto2
Often a question arises whether an injury arose out of the employment
though it unquestionably occurred in the course of employment? Illustrative of this kind of case is the case where the injury is caused by a natural
force, e.g., lightning, storm or excessive heat or cold. In determining
whether a casual relationship exists between employment and an injury
caused by a natural force, the courts seek to ascertain whether the employment involved a special exposure to the risk of injury from the natural
force in question. If the employee's duties expose him to a greater risk
with respect to the natural force causing the injury than that to which the
"community" or "public at large" is exposed, the
injury arises out of the
employment; otherwise, it does not."
A recent "lightning" case is McKiney v. Reynolds & Manley Lumber
Co."2 In that case, the employee of a lumber yard, located in a large open
area free of trees, wires or poles but containing between five and six
million feet of wet lumber stacked in heights up to ten feet, was killed by
lightning while leaning against a lumber stack. The director who heard the
case held that the danger of being struck by lightning was not peculiar to
the deceased's employment and that therefore the injury did not arise
Co. v. Brown, 48 Ga. App. 822, 173 S.E. 925 (1934) ; Givens v.
Travelers Ins. Co.,
71 Ga. App.

50, 30 S.E.2d 115 (1944) ; Harper v. National Traffic Guard Co., 73 Ga.
4. McClain v. Travelers Ins. Co., 71 Ga. App. 659, 31 S.E.2d 830 (1944)
; Gay v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety
App. 385, 36 S.E.2d 842 (1946).

5.

Co., 72 Ga. App. 122, 33 S.E.2d 109 (1945) ; Harper v. National
Traffic Guard Co., 73 Ga. App. 385, 36 S.E.2d 842 (1946).
Continental Casualty Co. v. Caldwell, 55 Ga. App. 17, 189 S.E. 408
(1936).

6. Thornton v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 198 Ga. 786, 32 S.E.2d
816 (1945) ;
New Amsterdam
7.
8.
9.

10.
11.

12.

Casualty Co. v. Sumrell, 30 Ga. App. 683, 118 S.E. 786 (1923)
;
Employers' Liability Assur. Corp. v. Montgomery, 45 Ga. App.
237, 179 S.E. 912
(1935).
Georgia Ry. & Power Co. v. Clore, 34 Ga. App. 410, 129 S.E. 799 (1925).
Chevrolet Motor Co. v. Bernard, 55 Ga. App. 17, 189 S.E. 408 (1937)
; Thornton v.
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 198 Ga. 786, 32 S.E.2d 816
Thornton v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 198 Ga. 786, 32 (1945).
S.E.2d 816 (1945);
National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Williams, 53 Ga. App. 78,
187 S.E. 142 (1936);
Chevrolet Motor Co. v. Bernard, 55 Ga. App. 17, 189 S.E. 408 (1937)
; Lumbermans
Mut. Casualty Co. v. Babb, 67 Ga. App. 161,19 S.E.2d 550 (1942).
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Fried, 64 Ga. App.
186, 12 S.E.2d 406
(1940) ; Givens v. Travelers Ins. Co., 71 Ga. App. 50, 30 S.E.2d
Globe Indemnity Co. v. MacKendree, 39 Ga. App. 58, 146 S.E. 115 (1944).
46 (1928); City of
Atlanta v. Parks, 60 Ga. App. 16, 2 S.E.2d 718 (1939). The difficulty
that courts
in other states have had in applying this test is illustrated by
the irreconcilable
conflict in the decisions pointed out in 26 IowA L. REv. 433, 435
(1941).
79 Ga. App. 826, 54 S.E.2d 471 (1949).

MERCER LAW REV1EIo

I Vol. 2

out of the employment. The director emphasized the facts that there
were no trees in the lumber yard and that the deceased did not have anything on his person-hammer, shovel or other metallic object-likely to
attract lightning.
The absence at the employee's place of work of trees and other objects
likely to attract lightning was sufficient, the director felt, to distinguish
this case from City of Alanta v. Parks,' where the deceased, engaged in
spraying disinfectant in a swamp, was standing under a tree with a fourgallon iron tank on his back when struck by lightning. On appeal to the
superior court, the award of the director denying compensation was affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, declaring that sufficient evidence
did not exist to sustain the findings of the director (this in spite of the
fact that his findings are usually said to be conclusive) and that a holding
was demanded that the deceased had been exposed to a hazard by reason
of his employment not equally shared by the community."4 The McKiney
case is an illustration of the slow but constant enlargement of the class of
injuries compensable under workmen's compensation statutes, some of
the language in the case implies that an injury to any employee working
outdoors resulting from lightning arises out of his employment.' On the
rehearing in the McKiney case the court pointed out that the weight of
authority in this country now compensates for heat prostration without
proof of increased hazards " ; and indicated that where injury is caused by
natural forces the finding of a causal relationship between employment and
the injury might not be essential to an award of compensation.
The courts in this and other jurisdictions are gradually whittling away
the requirement that an injury to be compensable must arise out of the
employment. That way of changing the law is slow and requires much
litigation. The General Assembly of Georgia, and legislatures elsewhere,
would facilitate the administration of the compensation acts by removing
the perplexing problems of causation embedded in the clause "arising out
of employment" and by imposing liability upon an employer for all injuries received by the employee at a place his work required him to be, in
other words, for injuries received "in the course of employment."
But the Georgia courts in the survey period also had considerable
trouble in applying the "course of employment" standard to the compensation cases before them. One group of cases that caused the courts particular
difficulty were those in which an employee was injured while going to or
coming from his place of work. In J'Vilcox v. Shepherd Lumber Co., the
13. 60 Ga. App. 16, 2 S.E.2d 718 (1939).
14. The court quoted with approval the following language from Globe Indemnity Co.
v. MacKendree, 39 Ga. App. 58, 146 S.E. 46 (1928): "Where the duties of the
employee entail his presence (at a place and a time) the claim for an injury there
occurring is not to be barred because it results from a risk common to all others
...unless it is also common to the general public without regard to such conditions,
and independently of place, employment, or pursuit."
15. " . . . When lightning breaks, indoor protection is a refuge indisputably safer
than in the open." 79 Ga. App. at 829, 54 S.E.2d at 473 (1949).
16. But see Jones v. American Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 45 Ga. App. 392, 165 S.E. 167
(1932), holding that injury from heat stroke did not arise out of employment in
the absence of a showing that the employee was particularly exposed to the hazard
by his employment.
17. 80 Ga. App. 71, 55 S.E.2d 382 (1949).
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Court of Appeals applied the often-enunciated rule that generally a workman injured while going to or from his place of work is not in the course
of his employment. The claimant in that case was a part-time brick mason
who lived about twenty miles from the mill where he was employed to
repair boilers. The contract of employment, the board found, did not include provision for transportation. After the private vehicle used by the
claimant and some of his fellow employees broke down, the employer lent
one of the men a truck to transport the workers in the vicinity back and
forth to work. No charge was made for the use of the truck. On the second
day the truck was in operation, the claimant was accidentally injured in front
of his home as he was attempting to board the truck. The court held that
the claimant was not injured "in the course of his employment." It distinguished Cooper v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co., 8 decided by the Supreme Court of Georgia. In the latter case an employee who lived near the
employer's mill went to the mill each morning to catch a ride with a third
party to the actual place of work, a distance of about twenty miles. The
injury occurred while the employee was en route from the mill to the place
of work. Tile Department of Industrial -Relations, a predecessor of the
Workmen's Compensation Board, held that the injury occurred in the
course of employment, and the superior court affirmed that decision. The
judgment of the superior court was reversed by the Court of Appeals, and
the Supreme Court in turn reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that
the department was authorized to find that the real beginning of the
employment was at the mill and that the employee was actually in the
service of the employer at the time and place of injury.
Another recent case, Hamner v. WJh'ite," was factually quite similar to
the Wilcox case, but compensation was granted in the Hamner case. The
employee in that case lived about sixteen miles from the sawmill where he.
worked. He rode to and from work along with twelve to fourteen other
millhands in a truck owned by the employer and driven by the employer's
foreman. The workers would board the truck each day at a certain "station." The employees' compensation did not commence until they reached
the mill, and no difference in pay resulted from a millhand's using the
truck to ride to and from work. The board found that an injury received
by the employee while riding the truck occurred in the course of employment and awarded compensation. The award was affirmed by the superior
court and by the Court of Appeals. The latter court felt that the case was
"almost on all-fours" with Cooper v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co.,
and that the real beginning of the employee's work was when he boarded
the truck to go to the mill.
Another interesting recent case where the question was whether the injury arose "in the course of employment" is London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Herndon.' A soil cement engineer whose work carried him

throughout the Southeast was temporarily in Daytona Beach, Florida. His
wife and child were staying with him in a cottage on the beach. One evening
after supper he and his family were driving to the cottage by way of a
18. 179 Ga. 256, 175 S.E. 577 (1934).
19. 80 Ga. App. 648, 56 S.E.2d 653 (1949).
20. 80 Ga. App. 178, 58 S.E.2d 510 (1950).
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beach road instead of the regular highway. The journey was made along
the beach road for the pleasure and entertainment of the engineer and his
family. He proceeded past the turnout nearest the cottage. Upon reaching
what appeared to be another turnout, he attempted to turn into it and
his automobile became stuck in the sand. When he tried to extricate the
automobile by jacking it up, it fell on him and killed him. The evidence
showed that the engineer customarily made out his reports on the day's
activities at night after the evening meal. The Court of Appeals upheld an
award by the board in favor of the decedent's wife. The court grounded
its decision on two propositions: (i) the law does not require as a condition to compensation that an employee at the time of the injury have no
objective other than the employer's business; (2) though the engineer,
if he unintentionally proceeded past the turnout nearest the cottage for
his personal pleasure alone, temporarily departed from his employment,
the moment he attempted to turn back for the purpose, among others, of
making out his reports, he again resumed the duties of his employment.
In a number of recent workmen's compensation cases the questions
whether an injury arose out of the employment and whether it arose in the
course of the employment are intertwined. In Studdard v. Phoenix Indemnity Co.2' a flight instructor was killed while accompanying one of his
employer's planes on a charter flight. He did not receive compensation for
the flight, but the employer's policy was to require some instructor to
accompany a plane on a charter flight. An employee was not required to
take a particular flight, but the understanding was that he was expected
to take his share of the flights. The Court of Appeals reversed a judgment
of the superior court affirming an award of the board denying compensation, and held that the employee's death arose out of and in the course of
his employment. The court stated that even if the deceased had been paid
by the charterer of the plane, the regular employer would still be liable
since "the mere fact that the mission may have two objectives, services as
intended by the contract of employment, and also some personal objective
of the employee, an injury sustained by an employee under such circumstances is an injury arising out of and in the course of employment."
In Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Fulhner2 a flight instructor and two
companions, after having several drinks, took off in a plane about 10:30
.p.m. The plane crashed and the instructor was killed. The Court of Appeals, both divisions sitting, reversed a judgment of the superior court
affirming the board's compensation award. The court held that only one
legal conclusion could be drawn from the evidence; namely, that the
injury did not arise out of and in the course of the employment. It recognized the rule that where an employee is found dead in a place where he
might reasonably be expected to be in the performance of his duties, the
natural presumption arises that his death occurred out of and in the
course of his employment; but it felt that the presumption disappears in
the face of the evidence that the instructor was engaged solely in his own
personal pleasure and not in fulfilling the duties of his employment. Judges
21. 79 Ga. App. 467, 54 S.E.2d 280 (1949).
22. 81 Ga. App. 97, 57 S.E.2d 865 (1950).
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Felton and Townsend dissented on the ground that the board had ample
evidence on which to base its finding.
Free v. McEver 2 was a case of first impression in Georgia. A meatpacker kept animals pending slaughter on a tract of land located
several miles from his plant. The employee in charge of the land was on
duty twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. By the contract of employment the employer was to furnish the employee a house and firewood
as part of the compensation. While dragging a log to be used as firewood,
the employee was injured. The injury was held to arise out of and in the
course of eimployment. Further, the fact that at times the employee also
did agricultural work on the land did not make him a farm laborer so as
to exclude him from the coverage of the act.
In General icc. Fire & Life Jssur. Corp. v. Prescott2' an employee of
a furniture store solicited business and collected accounts in a truck owned
by the employer. His hours were irregular but he usually returned to the
furniture store between 6:oo and 9 :oo p.m. On the afternoon of his death
he had spent over an hour in a restaurant playing a pin-ball machine and
drinking. Thereafter he left the restaurant and went across the street to
the truck. He returned almost immediately to get a paper bag to hold
eggs that he had received in payment on an account. He then walked back
into the street and collided with a moving taxicab. The court sustained the
holding of the director that his death was not caused by his intoxication
but instead arose out of and in the course of his employment.
A number of cases decided during the survey period involved situations
where the employee's pre-existing disease contributed to the injury. In
Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co. v. Kitchens2 5 the employee, who had a
diseased heart, dropped dead while on the job stacking lumber. The board
found that the death resulted from his work's aggravating a pre-existing.
diseased condition of the heart. The Court of Appeals sustained the board
on the basis of the often-enunciated principle that an accident arises out
of the employment "when the required exertion producing the accident is
too great for the man undertaking the work, whatever the degree of exertion or the condition of health."
In Bussey v. Globe Indemnity Co.2" the employee, after picking up the
employer's mail, climbed a flight of stairs to reach his place of work. Five
or six minutes after climbing the stairs, he suffered a cerebral hemorrhage.
The Court of Appeals sustained the board's award of compensation and
reaffirmed the well-established principle that "it is immaterial that the
physical exertion engaged in by an employee is not unusual or excessive
and that the employer did not know about the employee's diseased condition. '"2 7 The court also relied on the rule, previously laid down by the
Supreme Court of Georgia,2 8 that where the evidence justifies a compensation award it cannot be set aside, provided it was not based on an erroneous
legal theory, even though the board considered illegal evidence or assigned
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

79 Ga. App. 831, 54 S.E.2d 372 (1949).
80 Ga. App. 421, 56 S.E.2d 137 (1949).
81 Ga. App. 470, 59 S.E.2d 270 (1950).
81 Ga. App. 401, 59 S.E.2d 34 (1950).
81 Ga. App. at 404, 59 S.E.2d at 36.
American Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. Sisson, 198 Ga. 623, 32 S.E.2d 295 (1944).
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erroneous reasons for its decision.
Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. v. Buchanan2 1 was a case where an employee
lost the use of his arm from latent tuberculosis aggravated by a blow
arising out of and in the course of his employment. He was allowed compensation, the court holding that "where injury results partly from accident and partly from pre-existing disease it is compensable if the accident
aggravated or accelerated the ultimate result, and it is immaterial that
the claimant would, even if the accident had not occurred, have become
totally disabled by the disease."
In Finch v. Evins Amusement Co. 0 a seventy-five year old nian was employed part-time in a theater as a ticket-collector. He was found in the
theater dead from a heart attack about fifteen minutes before the time
for him to commence his duties. Compensation was denied, the court holdin that for an injury to be compensable where disease or physical disability
exists, exertion by the employee in the performance of his duties must
combine with the disease and contribute to the resulting condition of the
emoloyee.
In Employers Ins. Co. of Alabama v. Bass3" a carpenter employed on
an extensive building project reported for work fifteen minutes early carrying his. own toolbox weighing between thirty-five and eighty pounds, and
was told to report to a building 380 yards from the office. He fell dead
on the employer's premises about So yards from the place where he was
to do the actual work. The Court of Appeals, both divisions sitting, affirmed a compensation award by the board. Chief Judge Sutton and Judge
Felton dissented on the ground that the employee's death resulted from
a purely personal undertaking, the carrying of his tools to the job. 2
Injuries caused to an employee by the wilful act of a third person directed against the employee for reasons personal to the employee are not compensable under the workmen's compensation statute. 3
In Fidelity &
Casualty Co. of New York v. Barden" a restaurant employee was killed
by the accidental discharge of a pistol held by a third person who was
attempting to sell it to a fellow employee. The deceased had not participated in the negotiations. The court held that the injury arose out of the
employment and was compensable. Apparently the fact that the restaurant
29. 79 Ga. App. 439, 54 S.E.2d 156 (1949).
30. 80 Ga. App. 457, 56 S.E.2d 485 (1949).
31. 81 Ga. App. 306, 58 S.E.2d 517 (1950).
32. Other cases decided during the year in which heart disease contributed to the death
were: Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Bridges, 81 Ga. App. 395, 58 S.E.2d 849 (1950)
(evidence sufficient to sustain finding that death of lumber yard employee who had
assisted foremen in sorting boards less than five minutes before death resulted
from diseased heart accentuated by physical exertion) ; Maddox v. Buice Transfer
& Storage Co., 81 Ga. App. 503, 59 S.E.2d 329 (1950) (evidence sufficient to sustain finding that exertion in moving trunks and cartons did not cause heart attack) ;
Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Donaldson, 81 Ga. App. 629, 59 S.E.2d 529 (1950)
(evidence sufficient to sustain finding that death of employee who drove truck and
loaded and unloaded furniture arose out of employment where he complained of
pain in chest throughout last day of work and his condition became progressively
worse until his death a few days later).
33. GA. COD; § 114-102 (1933).
34. 79 Ga. App. 260, 54 S.E.2d 443 (1949).
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sold beer and that brawls among customers had occurred in the past had
some influence on the court.
The Workmen's Compensation Act also stipulates that compensation shall not be allowed for injuries resulting from an employee's "wilful
misconduct," 3 and it lists intoxication as a type of wilful misconduct. The
intoxication of an injured employee, however, bars his recovery only if
the injury is proximately caused by the intoxication and the burden of
poof is on the employer to show that intoxication was the proximate cause
of the injury." An interesting recent case on the effect of intoxication on a
claim for compensation was Klein v. Maryland Casualty Co. 3 In that case,
the employee was a traveling salesman. On the day of the accident, he
had been drinking heavily and his automobile was being driven by a customer. While asleep or in a stupor, he fell against the driver causing him to
lose control of the automobile and collide with an on-coming vehicle. The
employee was killed and his widow filed a claim for compensation.
The director denied compensation and his award was affirmed by the board
and by the superior court. On error from the superior court, the Court
of Appeals, both divisions sitting,"' also affirmed. Conceding that the burden was on the employer and its insurer to show the deceased was intoxicated and that his intoxication was the cause of the accident, the court
nevertheless felt that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the award of
the board. The court intimated that in spite of the burden placed on
the employer, "any evidence" was sufficient to sustain the decision of the
board, but it felt that it did not have to determine that question because the
evidence fully authorized the award without regard to the "any evidence"
rule.4" Applying tests of intoxication long established in Georgia," the
court concluded that the deceased was intoxicated because his acts indicated
that "he was not entirely at himself" and that his judgment was impaired,
and because his conversation and conduct had been noticeably affected by
his drinking. Two judges dissented on the ground that the employer and
his insurance carrier had not succeeded in showing that the intoxication of
the deceased was the proximate cause of his death.
The workmen's compensation statute also provides that the employee's
35.

A similar result was reached in American Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. Benford, 77 Ga.
App. 93, 47 S.E.2d 673 (1948), where a non-participating employee was injured
by the "horseplay" of a fellow employee.
36. Ga. Laws 1920, p. 177, Ga. Laws 1931, pp. 7, 43, GA. CODE § 114-105 (1933).
37. Ibid.; Shiplett v. Moran, 58 Ga. App. 854, 200 S.E. 449 (1938) ; Parks v. Maryland
Casualty Co., 69 Ga. App. 720, 26 S.E.2d 562 (1943).
38. 79 Ga. App. 560, 54 S.E.2d 277 (1949).
39. Ga. Laws 1945, p. 232, GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3501 (Supp. 1947), requires that the
full court consider cases in which one of the judges of a division dissents.
40. " . ..We think this case falls under the general proposition that findings of fact by
the State Board of Workmen's Compensation, on the question of wilful misconduct or
intoxication, and whether the wilful misconduct or intoxication of the deceased was
the proximate cause of the accident, are conclusive and binding on this court when
supported by the evidence." 79 Ga. App. at 562-63, 54 S.E.2d at 279 (1949).
41. "' . . . Intoxication does not consist merely in having partaken of intoxicating liquor,
or in being to some extent under the influence of it. Drunkenness, or intoxication, is
a condition where one is under the influence of intoxicating liquors to the e."tent
that he is not entirely at himself, or his judgment is impaired, and his acts or words
or conduct is [sic] visibly and noticeably affected. Sapp v. State, 116 Ga. 182 (42
S.E. 410)'." 79 Ga. App. at 561-562, 54 S.E.2d at 279.
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wilful failure to perform a duty imposed by statute is "wilful misconduct"
of a kind to bar recovery of compensation. 2" In Hall v. Kendall43 witnesses testified that at the time of the accident the employee was driving
his employer's truck at 5o m.p.h. or faster, The speed limit for the truck
with its load was 35 m.p.h. The Court of Appeals held that there was no
competent evidence to support the board's award of compensation, that
the board's award was based upon an erroneous conclusion drawn from
the facts and the law applicable thereto, and that an employer should not
be required to pay compensation to an employee for an injury resulting
from the employee's violation of a statutory duty. Two judges dissented.
They felt that the witnesses' testimony of the speed of the truck was "opinion evidence" and that the court should not say as a matter of law that the
triers of fact erred in refusing to accept the opinion evidence on the issue
of the speed of the truck.
The Workmen's Compensation Act provides definitely stipulated
benefits for certain permanent handicaps, such as loss of an eye; and provides further that the compensation for partial loss of an eye or for partial
loss of its use shall be such proportion of the payments stipulated for total
loss as the partial loss bears to the total loss. In interpreting the statute,
the Supreme Court of Georgia has held that where an employee has sustained two permanent injuries superimposed one upon the other and the
injuries have been sustained in different employments, the Compensation
Board, to determine the extent of disability attributable to the last employment, should first determine the total disability found to exist after the
last injury, then ascertain the disability existing after the earlier injury
sustained elsewhere, and subtract the latter from the former." Dunn v.
HartfordAccident & Indemnity Co." raised a unique problem for the Compensation Board. In that case, the director found that (i) by an earlier injury the employee had sustained a loss of vision, without glasses, of 8o
per cent, but when fitted with glasses his loss of vision fell to 4.3 per cent;
(2)
after the subsequent eye injury, the one for which compensation was
claimed, the percentage of loss of vision was 96.7 per cent and no improvement in the vision could be effected by the use of glasses. On the
basis of these findings, the director concluded that the loss of vision caused
by the later accident was 92.4 per cent. The Court of Appeals sustained
tie award of the board, holding that the board may take into consideration
improvement effected by artificial means in determining the extent of the
loss of use of a part of the body.G
If the condition of an employee who has received an award based on
partial incapacity becomes worse, he may file a claim with the board for
an increase in the award; and on the change in condition being proved, the
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

GA. CODE § 114-105 (1933).
81 Ga. App. 592, 59 S.E.2d 421 (1950).
American Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. Brock, 165 Ga. 771, 142 S.E. 101 (1928).
81 Ga. App. 283, 58 S.E.2d 245 (1950).
Notice, however, that the court went on to state that it was "not to be understood
as saying that where an employee suffers the loss of part of his vision which may
be restored that he has lost nothing as a matter of law, the finders of fact will
determine the extent of the loss in each individual case under its facts." 81 Ga. App.
at 289, 58 S.E.2d at 249 (1950).
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board will award additional compensation." In Phines v. Ocean 4ccident
& Guaranty Corporation" an agreement between the injured employee and
his employer based on a fifteen per cent permanent partial disability had
been approved by the board. Later the employee claimed he was entitled
to additional award because of a change in condition. The only evidence of
the change was the testimony of a physician (who had not seen the employee
until the hearing on the changed condition) that the employee suffered a
fifty per cent disability as a result of the accident. Nevertheless, the board
f6und that the claimant's condition had changed for the worse and that he
was entitled to increased compensation. The Court of Appeals held that
there was no evidence to support tile board's finding because the physician
was in no position to testify that the claimant's condition had changed since
the original award.
In 1946 occupational diseases were made compensable.
Prior to that
time, even though an employment involved a peculiar disease-hazard to a
worker, he did not receive compensation on contracting the disease unless
it arose out of an accidenial injury. The only case decided during the year
involving occupational disease was lmcrican Aut. Liability Ins. Co. v.
0 In that case
Ellison."
a stone cutter who had been subjected to the hazards
of silicosis up to a few months prior to disablement was not allowed compensation because the exposure had not occurred subsequent to the effective date of the act making occupational diseases compensable.
Under the workmen's compensation statute, dependents of an employee whose death results from an injury arising out of and in the course
of employment are ordinarily entitled to benefits. 1 Certain persons, including a surviving wife, are conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent and
are primarily entitled to the compensation payments." If a deceased employee does not have persons wholly dependent on him for support, then
benefits may be paid to persons partially dependent.': Zachery v. Royal
Indemnity Co.54 laid down for the first time the proposition that even where
there are persons totally dependent on the deceased (in accordance with the
presumption mentioned above) beneficiaries secondarily entitled to compensation will be paid if those primarily entitled waive benefits. In that
case a widow waived her rights by failure to file her claim for compensation within the statutory period. The court held that the employee's dependent mother, who had filed a claim within the statutory period, was entitled to payment. The court also indicated that should a widow die or
remarry after filing a claim and before hearing, secondary beneficiaries
would become entitled to the benefits. In view of this case, attorneys might
47.

Perrien v. Southern Co-operative Foundry Co., 60 Ga. App. 195, 3 S.E.2d 240
(1239) ; Miller v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 53 Ga. App. 622, 190 S.E.
868 (1937).
48. 81 Ga. App. 394, 58 S.E.2d 921 (1950).
49. Ga. Laws 1946, pp. 108-119, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 114-801, 114-827 (Supp. 1947).
50. 80 Ga. App. 62, 55 S.E.2d 258 (1949).
51. GA. CODE §§ 114-413, 114-414 (1933).
52. GA. CODE § 114-414 (1933).
53. A recent case, Mays v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 81 Ga. App. 478, 59 S.E.2d 286 (1950),
sets forth a formula for determining the amount of compensation to be paid to a
partial dependent.

54. 80 Ga. App. 659, 56 S.E.2d 812 (1949).
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well advise clients who are secondarily entitled under the statute to file
claims before the statutory period expires.
A number of minor acts on Workmen's Compensation enacted at the
i95o session of the General Assembly""and several Judicial decisions on
workmen's compensation handed down during the last year-" have not been
discussed in this survey because of a feeling that they do not represent significant developments in the law and would not be of general interest to the
legal profession.
55.

56.

Ga. Laws 1950, pp, 72-73 (increasing salaries of members of Workmen's Compensation Board) ; Ga. Laws 1950, pp. 324-325 (dealing with county ta.es for workmen's compensation in counties with over 300,000 population) ; Ga. Laws 1950, pp.
404-405 (making electric membership corporation and other co-operative corporations engaged in rural electrification "employers" under the Workmcn's Conpensation Act).
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Daniel, 80 Ga. App. 333, 55 S.E.2d 851 (1949)
(owner of delivery truck who was engaged in procuring business for a laundry and
for a dry cleaning establishment for a percentage of the fees collected held
employee and not independent contractor); Whitehill Laundry v. Daniel, 80
Ga. App. 396, 55 S.E.2d 861 (1949) (same) ; Kell v. Bridges, 80 Ga. App. 55,
55 S.E.2d 309 (1949) (evidence held to authorize finding that claimant's condition after accident was not such as to prevent him from filing claim within
one year from (late of accident as required by statute); Bituminous Casualty
Corporation v. Williams, 80 Ga. App. 337, 56 S.E.2d 157 (1949) (that a daughter
of claimant occasionally gave her fifty cents or a dollar did not prevent claimant
from being totally dependent on deceased) ; Travelers Ins. Co. v. Wofford, 81 Ga.
App. '21, 58 S.E.2d 853 (1950) (power of superior court to set aside an award of
the board is not analogous to its power to grant a new trial; newly discovered evidence is not a ground for setting aside a compensation award) ; Clark v. Fitzgerald
Mills Corp., 80 Ga. App. 312, 55 S.E.2d 762 (1949) (evidence failed to show that
killing of mill official was the natural and probable consequence of disputes between
the mill and its employees) ; McDonald v. Travelers Ins. Co., 81 Ga. App. 614, 59
S.E. 2(1 537 (1950) (time limit for filing compensation claim does not run against a
minor who does not have a guardian; unused part of an award to a partial dependent cannot, in the event he ceases to be a dependent, be added to the award of
another partial dependent): Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ilaygood, 81 Ga. App. 726,
59 S.E.2d 731 (1950) (evidence insufficient to sustain finding that claimant was
totally dependent on deceased) ; Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Garland,
81 Ga. App. 423, 59 S.E.2d 15 (1950) (where evidence indicated claimant after
the injury was able to earn more than average wage before injury, no compensable
loss was shown) ; Hood v. Jackson, 81 Ga. App. 465, 59 S.E.2d 45 (1950) (evidence
insufficient to authorize finding on wage rate of claimant).

